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Chapter 7
Responses of Mutual Fund Investors to
Adverse Market Disruptions
John D. Rea and Richard G. Marcis
Asset allocation by participants in 401 (k) plans is critical to the contribu-
tion that these plans make in providing for retirement security. An im-
portant concern in this regard is how plan participants might react to
adverse market developments, such as heightened market volatility or an
extended bear market. This concern is relevant because the growth of
401 (k) plans and assets during the last ten years has occurred when stock
prices have trended upward and interest rates have trended downward.
Consequently, many 401 (k) participants have not yet had to cope with
declining values in their 401 (k) accounts.
Only limited information on asset allocation in 401 (k) plans is avail-
able, and very little is known about how participants have reallocated
plan assets or contributions in response to changes in stock prices and
interest rates. Given the paucity of information on 401 (k) participants, it
may prove useful to examine the investment activity of mutual fund inves-
tors as an alternative. Mutual funds are a significant part of the 401 (k)
market, accounting for an estimated 37 percent of all assets held in
401 (k) accounts at the end of 1995. In addition, the 401 (k) market is a
significant line of business for mutual funds, representing over 8 percent
of all mutual fund assets at the end of 1995. Moreover, assets from all
retirement-related accounts, including 401 (k) plans, other defined con-
tribution plans, and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) , accounted
for an estimated 35 percent of all mutual fund assets at year-end 1995.
Furthermore, between 1993 and 1995, about 30 percent of the net flow of
new cash to mutual funds was from 401 (k) plans and another 37 percent
was from IRAs and other retirement plans. l Finally, an estimated 18.4
million households who owned mutual funds in mid-1995 had a family
member participating in a 401 (k) plan (Investment Company Institute
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1996c). These households represented about 60 percent of all mutual
fund owners and perhaps as many as 75 to 80 percent of all 401 (k)
participants. Of the 18.4 million households, approximately four out of
five held mutual funds in their 401 (k) accounts.2
In view of the overlap between mutual fund ownership and 401 (k)
participation and the high percentage of mutual fund assets and net
flows arising from retirement-related accounts, this chapter reviews re-
search on the response of mutual fund shareholders to short-term mar-
ket disruptions and to longer-term declines in stock prices. This topic has
received considerable attention lately, as concern has arisen over the
possibility of a run on stock mutual funds in the event of a collapse in
stock prices (Kaufman 1994).
To summarize the key findings, stock fund holders have not in the past
liquidated their holdings en masse in response to stock market breaks or
sharp sell-offs. They have, however, shown a sensitivity to cyclical and
secular movements in stock prices. In addition, they displayed remark-
able stability in 1994 in the face of market disruptions that included the
tightening of monetary policy, derivative losses at taxable money funds,
the bankruptcy of Orange County, and the Mexican peso crisis.
Although a run on mutual funds is not an impossibility, this evidence
suggests that the probability is low. The low likelihood partly reflects the
manner in which mutual funds are regulated. Assets of mutual funds
must be marked to the market daily, and consequently shareholders can-
not avoid losses associated with market developments by redeeming
shares. In contrast, under similar circumstances, bank depositors have an
incentive to make withdrawals because bank assets are not marked to
market. Mutual funds must also hold readily marketable assets and dis-
close information about their investment objectives and investment strat-
egies so that investors can assess the risks associated with mutual fund
investments.
In addition to regulation, certain characteristics of mutual fund inves-
tors also contribute to the low likelihood of a run. Surveys of the share-
holders show that most are seasoned investors with long-term investment
horizons. Surveys also indicate that fund owners generally have not re-
deemed shares because of market developments and that they are not
inclined to do so in the future. In addition, most shareholders have a
basic understanding of investment risk and are aware that mutual funds
are risky. As a result, they take risk into account when making purchase
decisions, although they typically place it within a long-term investment
horizon.
These characteristics of mutual fund shareholders suggest that partici-
pants in 401 (k) plans may not act precipitately as well in response to
market developments, although they may reallocate plan assets and con-
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tributions in response to longer-run changes in stock returns and interest
rates. Further research is needed on the determinants of asset allocation
in 401 (k) plans, as this conclusion assumes that the activity of mutual
fund investors generally is representative of that of 401 (k) participants.
In this regard, mutual fund shareholders with 40I(k) plans do differ
from those without plans in several respects. For example, those with
401 (k) plans tend to be younger, less educated, and less wealthy. They
also tend to have a higher proportion of their financial assets in 401 (k)
plans. In addition, those who only own mutual funds in their 401 (k)
plans appear to be much more dependent upon these plans for retire-
ment income than other mutual fund owners. Such differences might be
the source of differen t responses to market developmen ts.
Profile of Mutual Fund Owners
Individuals are the primary owners of mutual funds, held either directly
or indirectly through trusts or retirement plans. At the end of 1995,
financial institutions, businesses, endowments, nonprofit organizations,
and other types of nonpersonal entities held only 10 percent of the $2.8
trillion in mutual fund assets. Another 15 percent of mutual fund assets
was held in fiduciary arrangements, such as trusts and custodial accoun ts
for minors, a significant portion ofwhich is for the benefit of individuals.
Thus, depending upon the interpretation of fiduciary accounts, individ-
uals owned or controlled at least 75 percent ofall industry assets.
A survey of approximately 1,500 household owners of mutual funds
conducted in 1995 showed that the typical financial decision maker in
these households is 42 years of age; 54 percent have a college degree, 83
percent are employed, 15 percent are retired, and 77 percent have a
working spouse (leI, 1996b). Median household income is $55,000 and
median financial assets- excluding real estate investments, life insur-
ance policies, and retirement plan assets-are $40,000, of which 45 per-
cen t is in mutual funds (Table I). Stock mutual funds are the most com-
monly owned mutual fund, being found in the portfolios of72 percent of
all households (ICI, 1996c). In addition, 52 percent of the households
own money market funds, and 47 percent own bond funds. With regard
to other types of financial assets, over half of the households own indi-
vidual stocks, and roughly a quarter own individual bonds and annui-
ties. Table 1 also highlights the importance of retirement-related, tax-
advantaged accounts to mutual fund owners, ofwhom 62 percent have an
IRA, and 60 percent participate in a 401 (k) plan (ICI, 1996c). Of the
401 (k) participants, 80 percent own mutual funds in the plan, whereas
the remaining 20 percent holds no mutual funds in a plan. Of those
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TABLE I Selected Characteristics of Households Owning Mutual Funds, by
Ownership Through 401 (k) Plans
Owners with Owners with no
mutualfunds in mutualfunds in
Investor characteristic All owners 401 (k) plans 401 (k) plans
Median
Age of financial decisionmaker 42 39 46
Household income $55,000 $60,000 $52,500
Financial assets outside $40,000 $30,000 $60,000
employer-sponsored
retirement plans
Mutual fund assets outside $18,000 $20,000 $20,000
employer-sponsored plans
Percentofrespondenn
College degree 54 50 57
Employed, full- or part-time 83 93 74
Retired from lifetime 15 6 23
occupation
Spouse employed* 77 83 71
Types of assets ownedt
Individual stocks 52 53 51
Individual bonds 23 20 26
Annuities 22 15 29
Types of mutual funds owned:
Stock 72 72 73
Bond 47 46 48
Money market 52 51 54
IRA 62 48 74
Source: Authors' computations using 1995 Investment Company Institute survey.
*Percent of married households.
tMultiple responses permitted.
'Multiple responses permitted. Includes ownership in 40 I (k) plans.
owning mutual funds in a 401 (k) plan, 55 percent also own mutual funds
outside the plan.
Households with mutual funds in 401 (k) plans differ in a number of
respects from those that only own mutual funds outside these plans. Re-
flecting the relatively recent development of 401 (k) plans, those house-
holds with plan mutual funds tend to be younger, and a higher propor-
tion are employed, giving the group a higher median household income.
The group with mutual funds in a 401 (k) plan has accumulated smaller
amounts of financial assets outside the employer-sponsored retirement
plans and tends to have a higher percentage of financial wealth in mutual
funds. In contrast, those households not owning mutual funds through a
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TABLE 2 Selected Characteristics of Households Owning Mutual Funds Through
401 (k) Plans,July 1995
[nuestl»" characteristic
Median
Age of financial decisionmaker
Household income
Financial assets outside employer-
sponsored retirement plans
Mutual fund assets in 401 (k) plan
Percent ojrespondents
College degree
Employed, full- or part-time
Retired from lifetime occupation
Spouse employed*
Types of assets owned outside of
employer-sponsored plans'
Individual stocks
Individual bonds
Annuities
Types of mutual funds owned'
Stock
Bond
Money market
IRA
Employer-sponsored retirement plan
other than 401 (k) plan
Owners with Owners with mutual
mutualfunds only Junds in and outside
in 40[(k) plans 40[(k) plans
37 41
$50,000 $60,000
$20,000 $50,000
$12,000 $25,000
40 60
95 91
4 8
84 83
43 62
19 21
8 22
52 83
26 58
39 57
25 68
32 65
Source: Authors' computations using Investment Company Institute data.
*Percent ofmarried households.
'Multiple responses permitted.
401 (k) plan - most ofwhom do not participate in a plan - show a higher
frequency of ownership ofIRAs and annuities.
Further distinctions can be made among those households who own
mutual funds in a 401 (k) plan, as described in Table 2. Those whose only
holdings of mutual funds are in the plan are younger, have less educa-
tion, have a somewhat higher concentration of financial assets in their
401 (k) accounts, and are more conservatively invested than those 401 (k)
participants who also hold mutual funds outside 401 (k) plans. In addi-
tion, a significantly smaller percentage of those households only own-
ing mutual funds in 401 (k) accounts is covered by another employer-
sponsored retirement plan and has an IRA. Thus, these households
would appear to be more dependent upon their 401 (k) plans for retire-
ment income (leI 1996c).
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Response of Mutual Fund Shareholders to Movements in
Stock Prices3
The overlap in ownership of mutual funds in and outside 401 (k) plans
suggests that an analysis of the response of mutual fund owners to chang-
ing conditions in financial markets might indirectly provide some insight
into how 401 (k) participants might respond as well. To this end, this
section and the next examine the response of mutual fund shareholders
to movements in stock prices since 1944 and to a series of market disrup-
tions in 1994. For this purpose, shareholder activity is measured as the
net flow of cash to mutual funds, which is the difference between sales of
mutual fund shares to investors and redemptions of shares by share-
holders.
Stock Market Cycles and Sell-Offs
The post-World War II period provides a rich experience in which to
examine the reaction of mutual fund owners to stock market develop-
ments. During this period, the stock market experienced fourteen major
cycles, as measured by peaks and troughs in the monthly average of
Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 stock price index" Figure 1 shows that
eight of the cycles were associated with cycles in general business condi-
tions, as dated by the National Bureau of Economic Research, and only
the mild 1980 recession failed to produce a significant decline in stock
prices. The other six stock market cycles were not associated with busi-
ness cycles, although the contractions in 1961-62, 1966, and 1983-84
occurred in advance of slowdowns in economic activity (Table 3).
The stock market contractions differ considerably in length and sever-
ity. The duration of the fourteen contractions ranged from four to thirty-
seven months, with the average downturn lasting fourteen months. With
two exceptions, the shortest stock market contractions typically were not
associated with business recessions, whereas the longest contractions oc-
curred in conjunction with recessions. The largest decline in the S&P 500
index was 43.4 percent during the 1973-74 contraction, and the smallest
decrease of roughly 10 percent occurred in the 1959-60, 1971, and
1983-84 contractions. The average decrease in the index for all contrac-
tions was 19.5 percent.
The fourteen cycles contain several short periods of sharp declines in
stock prices. Because of the averaging of daily values, the largest one-
month decline in the S&P 500 index occurred not in the October 1987
market break but in September 1946, when the index fell 14.7 percent.
The second largest decline of 12.5 percent was in October 1987; three
other contractions produced one-month decreases in excess of 10 per-
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Figure 1. S&P 500 stock price index (monthly average of daily index, 1942-95). Shaded regions represent contraction phase of
stock market cycle. Source: Rea and Marcis (] 996).
TABL>; 3 Stock Market Cycles. 1942-95
Cycle
Expansion
Trough Peak
Contraction
Trough
Duration (months)
Expansion' Contractiont
Change in S&Pindex (%)
Expansion' Contraction'
Largest decrease in S&P index
in contraction (%)
One-month Two-month Three-month
Source: Rea and Marcis (1996).
*Trough to peak.
'Peak to trough.
:Contraction associated with business recession.
Apr. 1942
Jun. 1949
Sep.1953
Dec. 1957
Oct. 1960
Jun. 1962
Oct. 1966
Jun. 1970
Nov. 1971
Dec. 1974
Mar. 1978
Jul. 1982
Jul. 1984
Dec. 1987
Average
May 1946
Jun. 1953
Jul. 1956
Jul. 1959
Dec. 1961
Jan. 1966
Dec. 1968
Apr. 1971
Jan. 1973
Sep.1976
Nov. 1980
Oct. 1983
Aug. 1987
Jun. 1990
Jun. 1949:
Sep. 1953t
Dec. 19571
Oct. 19601
Jun. 1962
Oct. 1966
Jun. 19701
Nov. 1971
Dec. 19741
Mar. 1978
.luI. 19821
Jul. 1984
Dec. 1987
Oct. 19901
49
43
34
19
14
43
26
10
14
21
32
15
37
30
28
37
8
17
15
6
9
18
7
23
18
20
9
4
4
14
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33.5 -22.5 I I.7 18.3 20.9
67.8 -17.3 6.0 9.4 10.2
...38.1 -29.0 11.5 14.2 14.7 0
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cent. Over a two-month period, the largest decrease was the 23.1 percent
drop in the 1987 contraction. Sizable two-month declines also were
posted in the 1962 and 1973-74 contractions. Over a three-month pe-
riod, the 25.6 percent decrease in the index between October and De-
cember 1987 was the largest for all postwar contractions but was not
much greater than the 24.1 percent drop between June and September
of 1974. Substantial three-month decreases also occurred in the 1946 and
1962 downturns.
Net Flow During Expansions and Contractions
Shareholder activity in stock funds generally has not fluctuated between
inflows during periods of rising stock prices and outflows during periods
of falling stock prices.5 Indeed, such a pattern has been the exception
rather than the rule (Figure 2). Of the thirteen stock market cycles for
which complete data are available for both the expansion and contrac-
tion, only three-those in 1970-71, 1984-87, and 1987-90-showed
this pattern; that is, only in these three cycles was net flow positive over
the expansion and negative over the contraction (Figure 3). Of the re-
maining ten cycles, three experienced a net outflow in both the expan-
sion and contraction, and seven posted a net inflow in both the expan-
sion and contraction. The fourteenth cycle from 1942 to 1949, for which
data are only available since 1944, most likely was of the last type, as net
flow was positive from 1944 through 1949.
With only three minor exceptions, the eight contractions with positive,
cumulative net flows experienced a net inflow in each month. That is, the
inflow does not mask a short period of outflows (Table 4). Although no
significant net outflows occurred during these eight contractions, two of
the largest one-month and two-month declines in the S&P stock price
index were recorded during the 1946-49 contraction and during the
1961-62 contraction. Neither of these market breaks, however, was asso-
ciated with net redemptions, either during the break or in subsequent
months.
In the six contractions with net outflows, none cumulated over the
course of the entire contraction to a high level, ranging from 0.9 percent
of equity fund assets to 13.1 percent (Figure 3). The largest occurred in
the relatively mild 1976-78 contraction, and the net outflow in the 1987
downturn was 3.5 percent of assets.
The relatively low rate of net outflows over the entire course of the six
contractions would not necessarily rule out substantially higher rates of
net outflows within a shorter time interval. Despite the possibility, net
outflows measured over one-month, two-month, and three-month inter-
vals were never large. The largest one-month net outflow was in October
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Figure 2. Net flow to equity mutual funds (monthly, six-month moving average, 1944-95). Shaded regions represent contraction
phase of stock market cycle. Source: Rea and Marcis (1996).
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and Marcis (1996).
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TABLE 4 Minimum and Maximum Monthly Net Flow to Equity Funds During
Stock Market Contractions, 1946-90 (% of assets in previous month)
Contraction
Peak Trough Minimum Maximum
May 1946 Jun. 1949 0.6 1.3
Jan. 1953 Sep.1953 0.7 1.0
Jul. 1956 Dec. 1957 0.6 1.2
Jul. 1959 Oct. 1960 0.4 0.9
Dec. 1961 Jun. 1962 0.4 1.0
Jan. 1966 Oct. 1966 0.3 0.8
Dec. 1968 Jun. 1970 -0.1 0.8
Apr. 1971 Nov. 1971 -0.5 0.1
Jan. 1973 Dec. 1974 -0.6 -0.1
Sep.1976 Mar. 1978 -1.0 -0.4
Nov. 1980 Jul. 1982 -1.1 0.9
Oct. 1983 Jul. 1984 -0.1 1.9
Aug. 1987 Dec. 1987 -3.1 0.6
Jun. 1990 Oct. 1990 -1.0 0.3
Source: Rea and Marcis (1996).
1987 and represented only 3.1 percent of stock fund assets (Table 4).
This contraction also produced the largest two- and three-month net
outflows, but even over the three-month period, the outflow represented
little more than 4.0 percent of assets. The next largest outflows for these
time intervals ranged from 1.1 percent for the one-month period to 2.8
percent for the three-month period.
The 1987 Stock Market Break
On a monthly basis, the net outflow of $7.5 billion in October 1987 was
the highest on record, and it resulted primarily from an increase in share
redemptions and secondarily from a drop-off in sales of new shares. The
outflow in October reversed a $1.5 billion net inflow in September and
followed an average monthly net inflow of $3.2 billion during the first
nine months of 1987.
The net outflow in October likely was concentrated in the second half
of the month and could have been as high as $8.2 billion.6 Information
from thirty large complexes-which at that time held 80 percent of
equity fund assets-implies that perhaps $1.6 billion occurred on Octo-
ber 16, $2.7 billion on October 19 (the day of the break), and $1.3 billion
on October 20. 7 The three-day estimate of $5.6 billion is nearly 70 per-
cen t of the net outflow between October 16 and the end of the month.
Despite the record level of net redemptions in October 1987, several
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aspects of the redemption activity suggest that it was not large in a relative
sense. At most, the net outflow in the last halfofOctober amounted to no
more than 4.5 percent of assets." In addition, the burst in net redemp-
tions was largely confined to October 16, 19, and 20. Mter averaging
nearly $2.0 billion per day over these three days, the net outflow moder-
ated to an estimated $325 million per business day over the remainder
of the month and then tapered off to $60 million per business day in
November and December. For each of these two months, the net outflow
represen ted about 0.7 percent of assets.
Furthermore, mutual fund shareholders did not characterize them-
selves as having liquidated shares heavily during and shortly after the
market break. In a survey of households owning stock funds conducted
in November 1987, only 5 percent had redeemed shares during and since
the break (leI 1988). In a follow-up survey taken in May 1988, this figure
had risen only to 11 percent. The May survey, however, did reveal that
mutual fund shareholders had become more conservative in their invest-
ments and were exercising restraint in making new purchases of mutual
fund shares.
Perhaps reflecting this cautiousness, the net flow to equity funds re-
mained negative through the first quarter of 1989 even though stock
prices were rising. The net outflow resulted, however, not from a pickup
in the pace of redemptions but rather from a slowdown in sales. In fact,
monthly redemptions as a percent of assets declined, on average, about
one percentage point between the first nine months of 1987 and the
period from January 1988 to March 1989.
The 1976-78 Contraction and Long Waves in Net Flow
The net outflow of 13.1 percent in the 1976-78 contraction, which in-
cluded several monthly net redemptions of 1.0 percent of assets and a
three-month net outflow of 2.8 percent between March and May 1977,
occurred in the period extending from 1971 through mid-1982, when
equity funds experienced net redemptions in almost every month (Table
5). In comparison with net outflows in the expansions during this period,
the net outflow in the 1976-78 contraction was not, however, especially
large. For example, the cumulative net outflow in the 1978-80 expansion
was 27.2 percent ofassets, more than double that in the 1976-78 contrac-
tion, and the cumulative net outflow in the 1975-76 expansion also
exceeded that in the 1976-78 contraction. In addition, both of these two
expansions had numerous months in which the net outflow was more
than 1.0 percent ofassets, and the largest net outflow, 4.5 percent, for any
three-month period since 1944 occurred during the 1978-80 expansion.
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TABLE 5 Largest Net Outflows in Stock Market Contractions over One-, Two-
and Three-Month Periods
Period
One-month
October 1987
March 1977
January 1981
May 1977
August 1977
December 1977
December 1981
May 1982
August 1990
TWI>-month
October-November 1987
March-April 1977
December 1980-January 1981
June-July 1981
August-September 1990
Three-month
October-December 1987
March-May 1977
June-August 1981
Source: Rea and Marcis (1996).
Percent ojassets
in previous 7IWnth
3.1
l.l
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.6
1.9
1.8
1.4
1.2
4.1
2.8
2.2
Furthermore, from the trough in S&P index in March 1978 through
October 1978, equity funds experienced a net outflow of9.0 percent of
assets, even as the S&P index increased 13.2 percent.
This period ofeleven and one-half years in which equity funds were out
offavor with the investing public stands in marked contrast to the preced-
ing period, dating back to 1944, when equity funds experienced net
inflows in virtually every month of each expansion and contraction.
Stock prices in the 1944-70 period trended strongly upward, with the
S&P index increasing at an 8.4 percent compound annual rate between
the cyclical peaks in May 1946 and December 1968. In contrast, the 1970s
were a period ofstagnation in the stock market. The S&P index reached a
record high in December 1968, pushed briefly above that level in late
1972 and early 1973, but never saw it again until late 1979. The com-
pound annual rate of increase in the S&P index between the cyclical
peaks in December 1968 and November 1980 was only 2.1 percent.
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The period spanning the 1970s and early 1980s also contrasts with the
subsequent decade and a half in which stock prices generally rose and
stock funds again experienced persistent net inflows, apart from the
eighteen months after the 1987 market break. This relationship between
the long-run movement in net flow and stock returns, along with that
observed between the late 1940s and early 1970s, suggests that mutual
fund investors are sensitive to long-term rates of return on equity. The
1970s and early 1980s were a period of high inflation, making invest-
ments in real assets more attractive than those in financial assets, whereas
the high stock returns before and after this period likely contributed to
households' investing in equities through mutual funds.
The 1973-74 Contraction
The nearly 25 percent drop in the S&P 500 index over the third quarter
of 1974 was second in size only to the decline registered in the 1987 stock
market break. Nonetheless, the pace of net outflows ticked up only
slightly during the three-month sello{)ff, averaging a modest 0.4 percent
of assets. Mter the fall in stock prices subsided in the fourth quarter, net
redemptions moderated significantly, declining to less than 0.1 percent
of assets, and did not rise again until several months after stock prices
turned up inJanuary 1975. As stock prices continued to advance thereaf-
ter, net outflows rose further, reaching 1.2 percent of assets in tlle spring
of 1976, a figure that was about double the largest monthly net outflow in
the 1973-74 contraction.
Other Market Se/l-Offs
Movements in net flow to equity funds during other periods with signifi-
cant short-term declines in the S&P 500 index have been mixed. In some
instances, such as the market downturn sparked by Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait in August 1990, net flow turned negative by a small margin for a
month or two. Net flow also was negative for a two-week period with the
heightened market volatility in the spring of 1994 (Marcis, West, and
Leonard-Chambers 1995). In all these instances, the largest monthly out-
flow amounted to no more than 1.1 percent ofstock fund assets.
During other market sello{)ffs, such as the outbreak of the Korean War
inJune 1950 and the sharp sello{)ffbetween August and October 1957,
net flow either declined slightly and remained positive or continued at
the same pace posted in preceding months (Bullock 1959). And, in the
market decline in the spring of 1980, net flow actually turned from nega-
tive to posi tive.
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Other Cyclical Patterns
Although net flow has not generally fluctuated from positive in the ex-
pansion phase of the stock market cycle to negative in the contraction
phase, several recurrent patterns are observable in the cyclical move-
ment of net flow, measured as a percent of assets. To identify these pat-
terns, the expansion and contraction phases of the stock market cycle
have been divided into two stages. For the expansion, the first stage
includes all months other than the last six and the second stage covers
the last six months. For the contraction, the first stage is the first six
months, and the second is the remaining months, although not all con-
tractions extend into the second stage.9
Net flow has tended, on average, to rise during the expansion phase
and to decline during the contraction phase. For all fourteen cycles, the
average of monthly net flows, as a percent of assets, increases from 0.38
percent in the first stage of the expansion to 0.58 percent in the last six
months of the expansion (Table 6). Thereafter, the average declines to
0.25 percent for the first six months of the contraction, about the value in
the remaining months of the contraction.
The absence of variation in net flow between the two stages of the
contraction is the result of three of the contractions being so short that
they do not contain the second stage. Eliminating these three from the
computations of stage averages reveals a tendency for net flow to decline
as the contraction progresses. During the first six months of the contrac-
tion for the eleven complete cycles, net flow averaged 0.36 percent, as
compared with 0.26 percent for the remaining months.
The cyclical pattern in net flow results from a similar pattern in sales of
shares rather than share redemptions. Sales, as a percent of assets, tend
to rise during the expansion and to fall during the con traction (Table 7).
In contrast, the redemption rate has generally remained unchanged,
except in the second stage of the contraction, when it declines slightly
(Table 8).
From the pattern of sales and redemption rates, it would appear that,
to the extent stock fund owners respond to cyclical movements in stock
returns, they do so by adjusting the pace of new share purchases rather
than by changing the pace of redemptions. That is, stock fund owners
have tended to buy more intensively when stock prices are rising and to
become more restrained when prices are falling. Even so, the cyclical
variation in the pace of sales is not particularly large, ranging from an
average low of 1.2 percent in the last part of the contraction to 2.0 per-
cent in the last six months of the expansion. Furthermore, the sales rate
in the last six months of the expansion exceeds that in the first stage of
Cycle Expansion Contraction
TABLE 6 Net Flow to Equity Mutual Funds During Expansion and Contraction Phases ofStock Market Cycles (percent of assets,
period average, 1944-90)
Expansion Contraction Othlff than
Trough Peak Trough last six months Last six months First six months
Apr. 1942 May 1946 Jun. 1949 1.21* 1.66 1.l0
Jun. 1949 Jan. 1953 Scp.1953 1.05 1.31 0.83
Sep.1953 Jul. 1956 Dec. 1957 0.79 0.80 0.86
Dec. 1957 Jul. 1959 Oct. 1960 0.80 0.76 0.72
Oct. 1960 Dec. 1961 Jun. 1962 0.55 0.72 0.71
Jun. 1962 Jan. 1966 Oct. 1966 0.32 0.54 0.59
Oct. 1966 Dec. 1968 Jun. 1970 0.34 0.39 0.42
Jun. 1970 Apr. 1971 Nov. 1971 0.13 0.07 -0.21
Nov. 1971 Jan. 1973 Dec. 1974 -0.34 -0.39 -0.31
Dec. 1974 Sep.1976 Mar. 1978 -0.47 -1.04 -0.76
Mar. 1978 Nov. 1980 Jul. 1982 -0.91 -0.25 -0.32t
Jul. 1982 Oct. 1983 Jul. 1984 1.11 1.17 1.03t
Jul. 1984 Aug. 1987 Dec. 1987 1.06 1.42 -0.97
Dec. 1987 Jun. 1990 OCI. 1990 -0.25 0.94 -0.23
AVlffage
All cycles 0.39 0.58 0.25
Eleven complete cycles 0.37 0.46 0.36
Source: Rea and Marcis (1996).
'January 1944 to May 1946.
tFour months.
Remaining months
0.93
0.78
0.75
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0.44
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TABLE 7 Sales of Shares of Equity Mutual Funds During Expansion and Contraction Phases OfSlock Market Cycles
(percent of assets, period average, 1944-90)
ContractionCycle Expansion
Expansion Contraction Othf:T than Last six
Trough Peak Trough last six months months
Apr. 1942 May 1946 Jun. 1949 2.08* 2.62
Jun. 1949 Jan. 1953 Sep. 1953 1.89 1.79
Sep.1953 Jul. 1956 Dec. 1957 1.39 1.27
Dec. 1957 Jul. 1959 Ocl. 1960 1.22 1.26
Oct. 1960 Dec. 1961 Jun. 1962 1.14 1.14
Jun. 1962 Jan. 1966 OCl. 1966 0.87 1.08
Ocl. 1966 Dec. 1968 Jun. 1970 0.98 1.11
Jun. 1970 Apr. 1971 Nov. 1971 0.72 0.81
Nov. 1971 Jan. 1973 Dec. 1974 0.71 0.69
Dec. 1974 Scp.1976 Mar. 1978 0.52 0.48
Mar. 1978 Nov. 1980 Jul. 1982 1.05 1.82
Jul. 1982 Oct. 1983 Jul. 1984 4.22 3.89
Jul. 1984 Aug. 1987 Dec. 1987 4.46 6.14
Dec. 1987 Jun. 1990 OCl. 1990 3.19 4.08
AVf:Tage
All cycles 1.75 2.01
Eleven complete cycles 1.42 1.53
Source: Rea and Marcis (1996).
'January 1944 to May 1946.
tFoul"" monlhs.
First six months
1.90
1.36
1.23
1.11
1.20
1.15
1.15
0.68
0.62
0.59
1.88
3.55
4.481
3.0P
1.71
1.38
Remaining months
1.55
1.22
1.12
1.01
0.97
0.88
0.75
0.57
0.55
2.09
2.56
1.21
1.21
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TABLE 8 Redemptions of Shares of Equity Mutual Funds During Expansion and Contraction Phases of Stock Market Cycles
(percent ofasselS, period average, 1944-90)
ContractionCycle Expansion
Expansion Contraction Other than Last six
Trough Peak Trough last six 1Iwnths months
Apr. 1942 May 1946 Jun. 1949 0.87* 0.96
Jun. 1949 Jan. 1953 Sep.1953 0.85 0.48
Sep.1953 Jul. 1956 Dec. 1957 0.60 0.46
Dec. 1957 Jul. 1959 Oct. 1960 0.42 0.49
Oct. 1960 Dec. 1961 Jun. 1962 0.59 0.43
Jun. 1962 Jan. 1966 Oct. 1966 0.55 0.55
Oct. 1966 Dec. 1968 Jun. 1970 0.66 0.72
Jun. 1970 Apr. 1971 Nov. 1971 0.57 0.74
Nov. 1971 Jan. 1973 Dec. 1974 1.06 1.08
Dec. 1974 Sep.1976 Mar. 1978 0.99 1.53
Mar. 1978 Nov. 1980 Jul. 1982 1.95 2.06
Jul. 1982 Oct. 1983 Jul. 1984 3.12 2.72
Jul. 1984 Aug. 1987 Dec. 1987 3.40 4.71
Dec. 1987 Jun. 1990 Oct. 1990 3.44 3.14
Averagt'
All cycles 1.36 1.43
Eleven complete cycles 1.06 1.07
Source: Rea and Marcis (1996).
'January 1944lO May 1946.
tFour months,
First six rrwnths
0.80
0.53
0.37
0.39
0.48
0.56
0.74
0.89
0.93
1.35
2.20
2.53
5.45t
3.24t
1.46
1.03
Remaining months
0.61
0.44
0.36
0.46
0.52
0.64
0.75
0.86
1.35
2.17
2.23
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0.94
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the expansion, on average, by only 0.25 percentage points. This is also
about the same amount as the drofHlff in the sales rate during the first
six months of the contraction phase of the cycle relative to the last six
months of the expansion.
In moving from the contraction phase of one cycle to the expansion
phase of the next, both the sales rate and the redemption rate have
tended to increase. The average rate of sales in the first stage of the
expansion has exceeded the average sales rate in the last part of the
previous contraction by 0.26 percentage points. In addition, the average
redemption rate in the first stage of the expansion has exceeded that in
the last part of the previous contraction by o. I4 percentage points.
The Response of Mutual Fund Shareholders
to Market Disruptions in 1994
A series of market disruptions in 1994 provides further insight into the
response of mutual shareholders to financial developments. 'o
Tightening of Monetary Policy
The year 1994 produced a variety of financial shocks that had the poten-
tial to undermine investor confidence in mutual funds generally or in
specific types of mutual funds. The first of these occurred in February,
when the Federal Reserve initiated the first of six increases in the federal
funds rate in 1994. Interest rates moved upward over the course of the
year, producing significant losses for bondholders, including those in
bond mutual funds. The movement in interest rates also likely contrib-
uted to stock prices' posting only small gains during the year.
The first and subsequent increases in interest rates were associated
with outflows from domestic bond funds. These began in February 1994
and continued in each month for the remainder of the year; in contrast,
the net flow to these funds had been strong since 1990 as households
allocated a greater share of net purchases of financial assets to bond
funds in response to the steeply sloped yield curve and declining interest
rates. The outflows in 1994 induced by the increase in interest rates and
the flattening of the yield curve, however, were not concentrated within a
short span of time but rather were spaced over the course the year. The
largest outflow occurred in March 1994 in conjunction with a height-
ened market volatility but amounted to less than 2.0 percent of all assets
held by domestic bond funds. Relatively heavy outflows also occurred in
the fourth quarter, most likely as households redeemed shares to realize
capital losses for tax purposes.
The net outflows that occurred in 1994 were similar to those in 1987
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Figure 4. Net flow to domestic bond and income mutual funds (monthly, six-month moving average, 1984-95). First observation is
July 1984; last is February 1996. Source: Marcis. West, and Leonard-Chambers (1995).
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that began in April of that year in response to the tightening in monetary
policy (Figure 4). As in the most recent experience, the outflows in 1987
had been preceded by two years of heavy inflows, brought on by declining
interest rates. This experience, along with that in 1994, indicates that the
demand for bond funds depends upon the level of interest rates and the
slope the yield curve, and thus the net flow to bond funds is likely to have
a pattern that relates to fluctuations in interest rates.
In contrast to the outflow from bond funds, equity fund owners did
not respond to the tightening in monetary policy by redeeming shares on
balance. In fact, the net inflow to stock funds in 1994 was, at that time, the
second highest on record and only 7.9 percent below the record set in
1993. This occurred despite a lackluster performance of the stock mar-
ket. The only evidence of any response came in late March and early
April, when equity funds posted a small net outflow during a period of
increased stock price volatility.
Derivatives Losses at Taxable Money Market Funds
Between May and September of 1994, increases in interest rates caused a
number of taxable money market funds to experience losses on struc-
tured notes and other derivative instruments that threatened to cause
their share prices to fall below $1.00. Rather than allow the funds to
"break the buck," their sponsors or investment advisors provided capital
support, thereby permitting the share prices of the funds to remain at
$1.00. The only exception was a small fund that liquidated its portfolio at
a 6 percent loss.
Despite the publicity given to the injections of capital, shareholders
did not reduce their holdings of money fund assets. In fact, assets in-
creased 5.3 percent from the end ofApril through year end. Assets of the
sponsor-supported funds, however, declined 20.9 percent over this pe-
riod, suggesting that shareholders distinguished between the two types
of funds. The overall reaction, however, was not long lived, as assets
generally began to increase at sponsored-supported funds three months
after the announcement of the capital injection.
The Bankruptcy of Orange County
The filing for bankruptcy by Orange County, California in early De-
cember 1994, caused by losses in an investment pool managed by the
county for other California municipalities, raised concern among inves-
tors about the value of outstanding Orange County securities, as well as
obligations of participants in the investment pool of other California is-
suers managing similar investment pools. Because of the uncertainty re-
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garding the value of Orange County securities, many tax-exempt money
funds entered into support agreements with their sponsors or advisers to
ensure that the funds could maintain a stable share price of$1.00.
In response to these developments, shareholders reduced their hold-
ings over the remainder of December in tax-exempt money funds that
only held obligations of California issuers. In addition, California-only
tax-exempt bond funds experienced a pickup in the pace of outflows
relative to those of tax-exempt bond funds during December. These reac-
tions, however, were short lived, as assets at California tax-exempt money
funds began to increase in January 1995 and the net flow to California
bond funds came in line with those at other municipal bond funds in
February 1995.
Devaluation of the Mexican Peso
The devaluation of the Mexican peso in late December and the resulting
sharp decline in Mexican securities prices produced sizable losses for
holders of Latin American mutual funds and, as the effects spilled over to
other developing countries, for holders ofemerging market funds gener-
ally. For example, in the last two weeks of December, Latin American
equity funds dropped over 15 percent in value, and they suffered another
30 percent loss during the first quarter of 1995.
The reaction of shareholders in Latin American and emerging market
funds to these events was subdued. These funds experienced net outflows
during the last half of the month, but they were small in size and not
sustained. For example, the net outflow from Latin American equity
funds was less than 2.0 percent of assets in the last two weeks of Decem-
ber. The net outflow ended in March, and by the beginning of May, the
cumulative net inflow had more than offset the net outflow posted in the
aftermath of the devaluation. Other emerging market equity and bond
funds had a similar experience, although the net inflow from the bond
funds was larger than that from equity funds.
Reasons for Shareholder Response to
Market Developments
The above evidence indicates that mutual fund investors have been sensi-
tive to changes in interest rates and stock returns, but they have not
responded precipitately to market developments. The explanations for
the absence of runs are of two types: one involves the regulation of
mutual funds, II and the other concerns characteristics of mutual fund
owners.
John D. Rea and Richard G. Marcis 159
Regulation of Mutual Funds
In examining the potential for a run on mutual funds, it is natural to
superimpose the experience with bank runs upon mutual funds. Doing
so, however, is inappropriate because banks, for several reasons, are more
susceptible to runs than are mutual funds. One reason is that bank de-
posits are redeemable at par value unless the bank is insolvent. Thus, in
the event of a financial or economic shock that reduces the value of bank
assets, it is rational for depositors to attempt to make withdrawals to avoid
possible losses that would be sustained if the bank became insolvent.
Those withdrawing first are more likely to succeed, as the bank can meet
the redemptions with cash on hand and not be forced to realize losses
through asset sales.
In contrast, a mutual fund is required to value portfolio securities daily
and to reflect the valuation in the price at which it sells and redeems
shares. As a consequence, declines in the prices of the assets held by a
mutual fund are immediately reflected in the share price of the mutual
fund, thereby eliminating any OppOl"tunity for shareholders to avoid
losses through redemptions. 12 Mutual fund shareholders thus do not
have the same incentive as bank depositors to redeem shares immediately
after a sharp drop in asset prices. 13
A second reason banks are more susceptible to runs than mutual funds
is that a substantial portion of bank assets are illiquid loans about which
depositors generally have little information. This serves to increase the
uncertainty about the value of bank assets after a financial shock because
depositors may not know what loans are held by the bank and because
forced sales of the loans to meet deposit withdrawals are almost certainly
at a substantial discount from the values that could be realized with
greater time to conduct transactions (Calomiris 1993). The illiquidity
and non transparency of bank assets contrast sharply with assets held by
mutual funds, the vast majority of which must be readily marketable.
More specifically, for at least 85 percent of the assets in a bond or stock
mutual fund and at least 90 percent in a money market fund, the fund
must be able to sell the securities within a seven-day period at approx-
imately the prices at which they had been valued by the fund. In addition,
mutual funds are required to disclose sufficient information about their
investments to enable investors to evaluate the risk and prospective re-
turn associated with investing in the fund.
To protect depositors against loss because of insolvency and to mitigate
the risk of a run, banks are subject to a set of prudential regulations, the
purpose of which is to limit asset losses. One of the most important
aspects of such regulation is the requiremen t that banks hold a minimum
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level of capital as a buffer to absorb asset losses (Haberman 1987). In
addition, bank liquidity is enhanced by allowing banks to borrow from
the Federal Reserve. And, as a further safeguard against sudden with-
drawals arising from investor uncertainty about a bank's solvency or li-
quidity, the federal government insures bank deposits against loss up to
specific limits.
With only one exception, prudential regulation is not imposed upon
mutual funds, as investors in mutual funds are, by design, to be exposed
to investment risk. Mutual funds are heavily regulated,14 but the purpose
is to ensure adequate disclosure, asset liquidity, and accurate asset valua-
tion. In addition, mutual fund regulation safeguards the assets and ac-
tivities of a mutual fund from potential conflicts of interest that might
arise between the fund and those organizations providing services to it,
such as the investment manager.
The exception involves money market mutual funds. Although they
are not required to do so by law or regulation, money fund managers
have a stated objective ofattempting to maintain a constant share price of
$1.00. This investment objective, along with the practice thus far of spon-
sors' providing capital support when the share price of $1.00 is threat-
ened, has led the public to expect money market funds to have a stable
value. As a consequence, even though they must disclose that the share
price can deviate from $1.00, money funds are more susceptible to a run
than other types of mutual funds. In view of the public's expectation,
money funds are subject to regulations designed to minimize the poten-
tial for share price fluctuations arising from credit losses and illiquidity.
Shareholder Characteristics
In addition to the regulatory features that mitigate the potential for a
run, mutual fund owners have a number of characteristics that likewise
work against a precipitate reaction to adverse market developments.
Most shareholders see themselves as long-term investors saving for retire-
ment, their children's education, or some other long-range goal. And
they hold mutual funds as a means of achieving these objectives (ICI
1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1996a; Morgan 1994). Consistent with this view, the
typical shareholder in a survey of those who had redeemed shares in 1991
had been invested in the mutual fund for five years, and the vast majority
making a full redemption did so not because of market developments but
primarily because of a change in investment strategy. As a result, most of
those who closed an account in 1991 reinvested the proceeds in another
mutual fund. Finally, those making a partial redemption typically used
the proceeds to finance purchases ofgoods or services or to pay outstand-
ingbills (ICI 1993).
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Shareholders' responses to questions about their probable response to
market developments also point toward a long-range investment orienta-
tion. For example, most indicate that they would not adjust their port-
folios if the stock market dropped precipitously or if interest rates rose
significantly (lCI 1994b). Of those that would take action after a decline
in stock prices, the responses tend to be split about evenly between those
who would redeem shares and those who would purchase additional
shares. This is not an overwhelming endorsement ofthe widely held view
among analysts that mutual fund owners consider market sell-{)ffs to be
"buying opportunities," At the same time, however, the evidence suggests
that the vast majority would not regard stock market declines as "selling
opportunities." In contrast to the response to declines in stock prices,
most of those who would adjust their portfolios if interest rates rose
significantly would redeem shares and place the proceeds in certificates
of deposit (ICI I 994b).
Mutual fund investors generally recognize that investing in mutual
funds entails risk, and the vast majority have some degree of tolerance for
investment risk. They also tend to review the risk ofa mutual fund before
purchase and consider risk over a time horizon in excess of five years (ICI
1996a, 1997). Most shareholders report having a basic understanding of
investment risk, acknowledging an awareness of the relationship between
expected return and risk and recognizing the importance of diversifica-
tion in reducing risk; many also assess prospective purchases of new funds
within the context of their entire portfolio (ICI 1996a).
Mutual fund investors are not, however, a homogeneous group, and
there is evidence that some have only a limited knowledge of mutual
funds and have little awareness of some specific types of risks, such as
interest rate risk. And, even though many have indicated that they are
comfortable with the risk level that they perceive to exist in their holdings
of mutual funds, some shareholders have investment portfolios that may
be inconsistent with their tolerance for risk (lCI 1994a). Those showing
gaps in their understanding of mutual fund risk are not, however, neces-
sarily doomed to making poor investment decisions, as the majority of
these shareholders purchases mutual funds through brokers and finan-
cial advisers (ICI 1996b, 1997).
Mutual fund shareholders are generally experienced investors and are
not, for the most part, new to investing either in mutual funds or stocks
and bonds. Of those households in 1995 representing the more than
three-quarters of all household shareholders who own mutual funds out-
side a 401 (k) plan, an estimated 68 percent made their first purchase ofa
mutual fund before 1990. Twenty percent initially invested in a mutual
fund between 1990 and 1992, and only 12 percent since then. 15 In addi-
tion, the majority of those having only recently made their initial fund
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purchase owned stocks, bonds, and annuities before investing in mutual
funds, suggesting that many of new owners of mutual funds had some
expet;ence with investment risk'6 (ICI1994b). Furthermore, those with-
out previous investment experience were not necessarily making their
initial purchase without advice, as the majority transacted through bro-
kers and financial advisers.
Conclusion
Based on past evidence, mutual fund investors are unlikely to react pre-
cipitously to sharp sell-olfs in stock prices. Because 60 percent of house-
hold owners of mutual funds participate in a 401 (k) plan, by implication,
plan participants too would seem to be unlikely to withdraw en masse
from stock mutual funds during market downturns. Mutual fund inves-
tors generally have behaved as long-term investors and consequently
have shown greater sensitivity to long-run stock returns than to short-run
returns. Although direct evidence on 401 (k) participants is needed,
the overlap between plan participants and mutual fund owners points
to participants similarly taking a long-term approach to their 401 (k)
investments.
Research assistance was provided by Monica Bennsky, Srinivas Pula-
varti, andJianguo Shang.
Notes
1. These estimates for 401 (k) and other retirement assets have been prepared
by the Investment Company Institute.
2. These estimates for mutual owners participating in 401 (k) plans and their
plan investments are based upon a survey of 1,500 randomly selected mutual
fund owners conducted in July 1995. The estimates should be interpreted with
caution, as they likely overstate the actual numbers. Some respondents may
not have been able to distinguish a 401 (k) plan from other types of employer-
sponsored plans, and some may have reported other types of pooled investments
as mutual funds.
3. The material in this section is based on Rea and Marcis (1996).
4. A peak in the S&P 500 index is identified as a cyclical high that is followed
either by a three- or four-month period over which the index declined at least 20
percent or by a period of five or more months over which the index declined at
least 9 percent. The cyclical low or trough marks the end of the downturn from
which the index begins a sustained increase. The use of monthly averages con-
forms to the method used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis to date stock
market cycles (U.S. Department of Commerce 1989). Monthly averages also
smooth out transitory movements in the index that would affect daily, weekly, or
month-end data.
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5. Net flow is the difference between sales ofshares by mutual funds to investors
and redemptions of shares by shareholders. Sales include those due to exchanges
from bond, income, and money market funds into equity funds but do not in-
clude those from the reinvestment of income and capital gains distributions.
Redemptions include exchanges out of equity funds into bond, income, and
money market funds. The first year for which data on sales and redemptions are
available is 1944. Data are quarterly from 1944 through the third quarter of 1954
and are monthly thereafter. In those instances in which monthly data are re-
quired, a monthly estimate is obtained for each month of the quarter by dividing
the quarterly data by three. From 1944 through 1975, data of sales due to re-
invested dividends have been estimated. Between 1944 and 1960, data on ex-
changes are not available; no estimates have been made as the volume of ex-
change transactions was small. From 1944 through 1959, separate data for stock,
bond, and income funds are not available; however, stock funds constituted the
vast majority of mutual funds during this period.
6. This estimate assumes that a net inflow continued through October 15 at the
daily rate recorded in September. The estimate is consistent with information
reported by thirty mutual fund complexes for the period October 16-26 (Silver
1987). For this period, these complexes, which held 80 percent of equity fund
assets, had a net outflow of $4.6 billion. If we assume that the average net outflow
over October 22, 23, and 26 of $330 million for the thirty complexes continued
over the remaining four business days of the month, the estimated net outflow
would be $5.9 billion for the thirty complexes over the last halfof October. If their
80 percent share of equity assets also represents their share of equity fund net
flow, we get an estimated net outflow of $7.4 billion for all stock funds between
October 16 and 31.
7. These estimates apply the proportions of the net outflow for the thirty
complexes to the estimated total net outflow of $8.2 billion.
8. For the thirty complexes, the net outflow of $4.6 billion recorded between
October 16 and October 26 represented 3.3 percent of their assets. If the net
outflow over the remaining four days of the month was $330 million per day, we
get an estimated 4.4 percent of assets.
9. A six-month period before and after the peak was selected for the purpose of
determining whether net flow as percent of assets tended to accelerate near
market peaks and to decelerate shortly after market peaks.
10. This section is based upon Marcis, West, and Leonard-Chambers (1995).
11. For a discussion of the potential for a run on mutual funds, see Edwards
(1996).
12. To be more specific, an order from an shareholder to redeem shares must
be executed by the mutual at the time of the next pricing or valuation of the
fund's portfolio.
13. The decline in securities prices might cause some investors to redeem
shares because the event might have caused their expectations about future se-
curities prices to differ from expectations now embedded in securities prices.
This is not to say that shareholders can avoid those losses caused by the financial
shock through the redemption but ratherthat they may redeem because ofantici-
pated further losses. By the same token, expectations could have been altered to
cause other investors to view the existing level of securities prices as representing
a buying opportunity, triggering purchases of mutual fund shares.
14. At the federal level mutual funds are regulated by the Securities and Ex-
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change Commission under the provisions of the Investment Company Act of
1940. Mutual funds also are subject to the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
15. This information is from a survey that asked questions about investment
experience only of those participants owning mutual funds outside a 401 (k) plan.
Those owning mutual funds only through a 401(k) plan differ in a number of
respects from other shareholders, as described above. From the standpoint of
investment experience, since the expansion of the number of 401 (k) participants
has largely occurred within the last ten years, households only owning funds
through a 401 (k) likely have had less investment experience. Nonetheless, the
investment experience for many is not solely limited to mutual funds, as a signifi-
cant number own stocks and bonds outside of the plan (Table 2).
16. This information is based upon a survey conducted in mid-1994 of owners
who made their first purchase outside a 401 (k) plan sinceJanuary I, 1992.
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